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Abstract
The proven inability of the Geneva Conventions and other codifications of the 
laws of war to introduce accountability into Western counterterrorism policy is 
due, first, to inherent weaknesses in just war theory, especially the unsustainable 
premise that how we fight (ius in bello) and why we fight (ius ad bellum) can be 
kept logically distinct and, second, to the impossibility of applying a set of rules 
developed for wars that were expected to end and be replaced by peace to wars 
that can, in principle and practice, never end. The futility of insulating how we 
fight from why we fight becomes especially clear when we consider the tactics that 
political leaders and military planners are willing to countenance when faced with 
averting a nuclear attack by a terrorist group on a major urban center, especially on 
the capital city where political leaders live together with their families. The futility 
of insulating why we fight from how we fight is nicely illustrated by the advent of 
drone warfare, where low casualty rates create an incentive for mission creep and 
increasing involvement in remote struggles with only an anemic connection to the 
war-making power’s core national security interests. In addition, the classical laws 
of war assume that war and peace are twinned concepts and that all limits on how 
we fight are rooted in a two-part understanding that serving in the enemy army is 
no crime and that war will be followed by peaceful coexistence between former bel-
ligerents. The irrelevance of these assumptions for the war on terror helps explain 
the impotence of the laws of war as a regulator of that conflict. The conclusion to 
which this argument leads is that counterterrorism must orient itself to the extent 
possible toward the fundamental premise of the law-enforcement model for man-
aging violence, and that is the individualization of culpability, a premise and a 
practice unknown to «war».
Keywords: Counterterrorism. Individualization. peace. perfidy. War.
Can the fight against international Salafi terrorism be effectively pursued 
within the bounds of domestic constitutionalism and the international laws of 
war? The answer is yes and no. This is arguably the most important theoreti-
cal and ethical question raised by contemporary counterterrorism policy as it is 
being developed and implemented in Europe and the United States. The ques-
tion needs to be asked because many of the practices adopted by contemporary 
democracies, such as military and police detention to prevent the commission 
of future crimes and resort to reduced-procedure military trials for terrorist 
suspects, represent prima facie violations of well-established rule-of-law norms. 
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Formulated more broadly: does classical liberalism provide a workable theoreti-
cal framework for national security in the age of terrorism? I will argue that the 
liberal principles embedded in the modern law of armed conflict are much less 
useful in this respect than those embedded in modern criminal law and criminal 
procedure.
The factors that make this an important and difficult question, in any case, 
include: populist pressures for illiberal policies in the wake of terrorist atroci-
ties, the difficulty of reconciling a closed demography with an open economy, 
globalized communication, transportation and banking networks made easily 
accessible to homicidal conspirators, a laxly regulated international free mar-
ket (both aboveboard and clandestine) in dangerous weaponry, the ongoing and 
consequential political collapse of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the spillover effects 
of current proxy wars between Iran and Sunni-Arab states, beneath-the-radar 
self-radicalization of Internet-surfing second-generation muslim youth living es-
tranged lives in the West, and the surfeit of soft targets especially in urbanized 
areas of Europe and America, including vital infrastructure vulnerable to cyber-
attack and which cannot all be hardened, certainly not simultaneously, not to 
mention the ultimate nightmare of a nuclear device smuggled into a major urban 
center in Europe or the U.S.
Classical liberalism, as an approach to both domestic and international poli-
tics, did not evolve to meet this ensemble of threats. But if inherited rule-of-law 
norms need to be violated in order to respond effectively to today’s threat en-
vironment, can such violations be given a principled (rather than ad hoc) justi-
fication? And what will this justification be? This question cannot be answered 
by the history of ideas. Nevertheless, attempts to answer it can be enriched and 
raised to a higher level if informed by a scholarly reexamination of classic liberal 
arguments for sticking to rule-of-law norms (including nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century codifications of the laws of war) despite strong pressures to put them 
aside under emergency conditions. A plausible historical argument can be made 
that the emergence, evolution, and survival of liberal-democratic systems would 
be incomprehensible if their core institutions and binding treaty obligations 
made no positive contribution to national security. This may be true even and es-
pecially when violent sub-state groupings with «idealistic» (sometimes religious) 
motives, rather than rival states or individual criminals, pose the palpably great-
est threat to the West’s physical security. Indeed, nineteenth-century liberalism, 
roughly speaking, adamantly denies that successful counterterrorism requires 
the tradeoff between liberty and security that is now commonly assumed to be 
self-evidently required. But the question remains: Has jihadist terrorism made 
obsolete a principled liberal approach to managing the most dangerous forms 
of social violence?
Among the related questions that political theorists should be addressing to-
day are these: Can secrecy be made compatible with accountability? Can the 
democratic right of citizens and the press to examine government action be 
reconciled with the operational imperatives of covert operations conducted by 
national-security agencies within «the deep state»? Can mass surveillance de-
signed to intercept terrorist plots be conducted in a way that is both effective 
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and respectful of rights of individual privacy? Can democratic political systems 
insulate counterterrorism policy from partisan politics and electoral posturing? 
How can the powerful public emotions of fear and anger, insecurity and the 
craving for vengeance, be tapped as a source of support for counterterrorism 
policies without being manipulated for political purposes? And how can coun-
terterrorism officials be compelled to speak clearly about the inevitability of risk-
risk tradeoffs (e. g., the potential downsides of hardened cockpit doors) even 
though bureaucratic and especially electoral incentives naturally lead to their 
concealment?
Answering such questions and drawing out their full implications, I believe, 
should be among the primary focuses of political theory today. This article, which 
focuses on the inherent difficulty of regulating counterterrorism by the classical 
laws of war, is a modest contribution to that effort.
1. Justifying Violence by Invoking Rights
Classic theories of the just conduct of war, specifying the rights which should 
be accorded to civilians and soldiers placed hors de combat, were developed 
in the context of symmetrical war. my aim here is to probe the weakness of the 
rights afforded such ideally protected groups when government lawyers apply 
just war theory to asymmetrical war, especially to the so-called war on terror.
I will be focusing on the American practice of militarized counter-terrorism 
because that is the experience I know best. But the theme is relevant to the other 
liberal democracies facing the same threat of international jihadist terrorism.
Before turning to the fragility, in the war on terror, of the rights ostensibly 
afforded protected groups by the laws of war, I need to address a preliminary 
point, namely that rights in general are much less «innocent» than is commonly 
assumed. Conspiracy theories about the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 («it’s 
all about oil!», «it’s all about Israel!») have proven very attractive to some be-
cause they serve to distract attention from the embarrassingly obvious fact that 
the war was publicly justified (and strongly supported by many whose acqui-
escence was decisive) on the grounds that the human rights of Iraqi citizens 
needed protection from Saddam’s brutal police state. Formulated more gener-
ally, rights are never beyond reproach for the simple reason that they furnish 
all-too-convenient moral justifications for the use of force. The image of rights 
as purely defensive barriers or shields is therefore highly misleading. A right is 
a culturally and socially constructed trip-wire. When a legally recognized right 
is violated, force can be legally deployed against the violator. This makes the 
relation between human rights and war inherently ambiguous. Humanitarian 
efforts to limit the barbarism of war routinely invoke human rights in this good 
cause. But political theory, taking a broader view, needs to shine a light on the 
«bello-genic» potential of rights protection, something that the recent history of 
humanitarian intervention should have by now made painfully obvious. Rights 
not only justify violence, they also provoke violence. A right is a power and the 
exercise of power typically produces some level of resentment and often a desire 
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for retaliation. This is emphatically true of exercises of power justified by the 
need to redress or prevent violations of human rights.
Liberalism has developed two legal and normative frameworks to regulate col-
lective responses to violence: the criminal law (both substantive and procedural) 
and the laws of war. Neither of these frameworks was developed to deal with ter-
rorism which is sui generis. Bank robbers do not commit suicide to attract more 
recruits to their political cause and terrorism is a not a conflict between states. 
domestic insurgencies, usually classified as «non-international armed conflicts» 
(NIAC), have some of the same sui generis qualities as terrorism; and indeed in-
surgencies frequently resort to terrorist tactics. But international Salafi terrorism, 
which is our major concern today, is quite unlike a domestic insurgency, and thus 
international law efforts to regulate responses to the latter do not tell us much 
about how to regulate responses to the former. In any case, because terrorism is 
neither a criminal act nor an act of war, but rather something in between, liberal 
policy makers remain uncertain about which set of rules should regulate the so-
called war on terror. This quandary has had the deplorable consequence of leav-
ing counterterrorism weakly disciplined and largely unaccountable in practice.
In America, at least, the debate about rules bleeds easily into a debate about 
which government agency (the FBI, the pentagon, or the CIA) should take the 
lead. The dominant place of the department of defense in the armed wing of 
America’s federal bureaucracy has meant that the obvious differences between 
warfighting and counterterrorism have been no obstacle to defining counter-
terrorism as «war». This classification may seem merely verbal, but it has been 
highly consequential. For instance, policemen attempting to apprehend a crimi-
nal hiding within an apartment building are not allowed to blow up the building 
and kill its civilian inhabitants. Such severe limitations on permissible collateral 
damage do not apply to the battlefield. As a consequence, classifying counterter-
rorism as warfighting rather than crime-fighting is part of an concerted effort by 
the American national security establishment to shed what it considers overly 
liberal restrictions that «tie its hands» in the war on terror. This loosening of 
restrictions on the conduct of counterterrorism is taken a step further by pos-
tulating that the war on terror differs from other wars because every one of our 
enemies in this conflict is a war criminal, ineligible for the ius in bello protections 
ideally accorded to ordinary enemy combatants.
problems with applying classical ius in bello norms to asymmetrical wars are 
not wholly unique but rather reflect problems with applying ius in bello norms to 
symmetrical wars as well, even though the problems are much more acute in the 
asymmetrical case. It needs be acknowledged, in any case, that these problems 
reflect fundamental weaknesses in just-war theory in general. The very distinc-
tion between ius ad bellum and ius in bello on which the theory of just war hinges 
is itself highly problematic. Ius ad bellum, according to the classical theory, refers 
to the justice of the war itself. For example, a war fought in self-defense is a «just 
war» because every nation has a right to defend itself against aggression. Ius in 
bello, by contrast, refers to the rules that combat soldiers are obliged to follow in 
the conduct of hostilities: it is forbidden to torture or kill prisoners, for example, 
or it is forbidden to deliberately target civilians.
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2. The Interdependence of How We fight and Why We fight
In his classic work on the subject, michael Walzer argues that the ius ad bel-
lum rule of collective self-defense is meant to defend the «common life» of our 
exclusive national community while ius in bello norms are meant to defend our 
«common humanity» 1. The ius ad bellum versus ius in bello distinction is usually 
deemed pivotal to the laws of war because it is typical in war for both sides to 
be sincerely convinced of the justice of their cause. Hence the laws of war ask 
soldiers to put aside the rightness or wrongness of each side’s cause and agree to 
certain rules of common humanity that should be applied even to those whose 
cause is unjust.
The problems with this construction are legion. For one thing, the ius ad 
bellum norm of collective self-defense is extraordinarily permissive and elastic 
because the «self» which is being defended can swell at whim to include, for 
instance, the remote property interests of the remote allies of remote allies. Sec-
ond, ex ante justifications of war (ius ad bellum) are highly ephemeral since war 
is opportunistic, and war aims constantly evolve in the course of any armed con-
flict. This makes the very idea of a just or justified war highly problematic. A war 
initiated for a cause that turn out to be unfeasible will be happily continued for 
a cause subsequently discovered and not even mentioned or contemplated at the 
outset. The same skeptical view of ius ad bellum follows from the observation 
that different actors on each side often have different (and sometimes mutually 
inconsistent) war aims. Since it is highly unlikely that all these war aims will be 
just, it is highly unlikely that wars are ever just in the strong sense of motivated 
by justice.
In war, as in the rest of human endeavor, underlying motivations and pub-
lic justifications sometimes diverge. Indeed, it is typical for war-makers to hire 
justification-makers to lend a patina of respectability to predatory wars. But why 
take ius ad bellum seriously if it can be bought? Furthermore, human beings 
regularly and retrospectively inflate the justice of any war that cost them a great 
deal, since walking away from «sunk costs» is not part of ordinary morality. For 
example, Abraham Lincoln, after realizing how many hundreds of thousands of 
lives were lost in the American Civil War ramped up the rationale for the war to 
ending chattel slavery. He had no such war aim in mind when the conflict began. 
Only such a highly moral cause could possible justify all that slaughter, however. 
So how can a war aim that is coined after the fact turn a high-casualty conflict 
into a just war?
In the war on terror, ius ad bellum becomes additionally problematic. The 
right of self-defense against invisible micro armies conceivably armed with nu-
clear weapons can easily justify the «one percent doctrine», meaning the theory 
that even a minor possibility of a catastrophic attack justifies a preemptive strike. 
This was more or less the argument adduced to rationalize the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. There was a remote possibility that Saddam Hussein might develop nuclear 
weapons. There was also a remote possibility that Saddam might sometime in the 
1 Walzer, 1977.
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future give these weapons to Osama bin Laden who might, at some unspecified 
future time, launch a no-return-address nuclear attack on the United States. This 
convoluted causal speculation was apparently enough to make the invasion of a 
Iraq, a country that had never committed an act of aggression against the U.S., 
into a «just war» in the ius ad bellum sense. A domestic parallel would be the 
following. Because I suspect that you may sometime in the future purchase a gun 
and then sometime later give that gun to someone who might just possibly shoot 
me, I am justified today in shooting you. Anyone who reasoned this way in a do-
mestic context would be better off pleading insanity rather than self-defense. But 
when just war theory, with its elastic concept of self-defense, is applied to the war 
on terror, such absurd rationalizations seem perversely legitimate.
It can be added here that just war theory allows the side that is ostensibly 
defending itself against «unprovoked» aggression to continue hostilities until the 
threat is removed, the enemy surrenders and «peace» is restored. In the war on 
terror, unfortunately, this principle is a formula for endless war, because weapons 
of compact destructiveness cannot be un-invented and continue to proliferate, 
because aggrieved adventurers willing to risk their lives will always exist, and 
because terrorists do not belong to the kind of hierarchical organization which 
can enforce a coordinated «surrender» on its own partisan warriors.
The war on terror explodes the premises of ius in bello doctrine as well. For 
example, what response can be «proportional» to a hypothetical future attack on 
a major Western city using a smuggled nuclear device? proportionality assumes 
some capacity to measure the harm inflicted by the enemy, something impossible 
when dealing with threats that have not yet materialized and that must be pre-
vented from taking place.
michael Walzer’s claim that ius ad bellum and ius in bello «are logically in-
dependent» is highly debatable 2. Why we fight and how we fight cannot be so 
clearly separated from each other. The rules which combatants voluntarily ac-
cept depend essentially on the reasons why they are fighting in the first place. In 
the war on terror, this inextricable connection between how we fight and why 
we fight means that militarized counterterrorism has an inevitable tendency to 
overleap all limits postulated by theorists and codifiers of International Humani-
tarian Law (IHL). For example, if Washington, dC, where American leaders 
live with their families can potentially be obliterated without warning by a sur-
prise nuclear attack by non-state actors who cannot be deterred, there will be no 
methods of war-making that such leaders will consider out-of-bounds.
It should be mentioned in this context that «security» is a highly emotion-
al state of mind, the flip-side of «insecurity». Terrorism, by definition, creates 
fear that is disproportional to the actual harm that terrorists can inflict. It is 
also a tactic aimed explicitly at neutralizing the military advantage possessed by 
the better armed side in a conflict and thus creating a sense of acute insecurity 
among those who had previously felt themselves well-protected by an ability 
to deter the aggressive intentions of hostile nation-states. The possibility that 
2 Walzer, 1977: 21.
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Wmd could be smuggled clandestinely into a densely populated Western city 
introduces an element of nervous hysteria into decision-making councils, making 
an emotional overreaction, such as we saw after 9/11, almost inevitable. This is 
how the George W. Bush administration argued: Because we cannot wait for the 
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud, we have to invade Iraq before we have 
any evidence that such an act will contribute in any way to America’s national 
security. But adopting «regime change» as a counterterrorism strategy is patently 
absurd since the military overthrow of dictators will typically, at the moment of 
regime collapse, destroy command and control over amply stocked weapons de-
pots, flooding the international clandestine arms market with lethal equipment, 
including ground-to-air missiles, that make the terrorist threat greater than ever.
3. The Principle of Distinction Explained
The central pillar of ius in bello theory is the principle of distinction, namely 
the all-important difference between combatants and non-combatants or bellig-
erents and civilians. To understand why this distinction is typically ignored and 
overridden in the war on terror, we need to look first at its historical origin. It 
goes without saying that legal restrictions on the way soldiers treat civilians were 
not written into international codifications of the laws of war because of the ir-
resistible lobbying power of potential civilian victims of war crimes. The laws of 
war, as historian john Witt helpfully explains, were indirect expressions of «the 
hard hand of war», written in pursuit of military objectives and accepted by com-
manders solely for that reason 3. A good example is the prohibition on torturing 
prisoners, a regulation adopted and enforced by military leaders who wished to 
encourage reciprocity and to lure enemy troops to surrender without a fight.
Something similar can be said about the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. A field commander has to control his potentially unruly troops 
who would definitely prefer to pillage an undefended village and rape its female 
inhabitants than face an armed force with the desire and capacity to kill them. 
As a result, commanders need to enforce a very strict norm against deliberately 
targeting civilians and wasting ammunition on non-combatants in order to com-
pel their forces to face the enemy’s fire. This «realist» account of the origin of 
the principle of distinction helps explain why ius in bello norms have generally 
exerted little constraint on air bombardment, even after the ability to hit tar-
gets accurately increased, simply because bombardiers need not be forced, like 
ground troops, to forego the counterproductive temptation to pillage weakly 
defended civilian targets.
It is also worth recalling that in the eighteenth century, when the principle 
of distinction became widely recognized as a symbol of civilized warfare, ius 
in bello theory was regularly invoked to justify genocide. Because the Ameri-
can Indians indiscriminately slaughtered women and children on the frontier, 
they were classified as uncivilized savages by the European settlers. As uncouth 
3 Witt, 2013.
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barbarians who did not respect ius in bello norms, they could be «justly» exter-
minated. In other words, ius in bello norms were invoked to release the white 
man from operating under ius in bello norms. This is the very same permissive 
logic by which militarized counterterrorism operates today, since jihadists are the 
uncivilized savages of the contemporary world. The «right» of civilians not to be 
targeted has been cleverly repurposed into a justification for conducting war in 
a way that foreseeably results in civilian deaths that need not even be counted.
The ius in bello necessity principle also imposes little or no restraints on mili-
tarized counterterrorism. The principle is usually interpreted to mean that kill-
ings are not allowed if less destructive means of achieving legitimate military 
objectives are available. A good example is the policy of using drones to kill 
those terrorist suspects who cannot be captured. If capture, which would cer-
tainly qualify as a less harmful way of incapacitating terrorists than assassination, 
proves impossible, according to this logic, killing is morally and legally permit-
ted. But a moment’s thought reveals that the posited «impossibility» of capturing 
suspected terrorists is highly artificial and contrived. Suspects can be «impos-
sible» to capture simply because we have not invested sufficient resources in 
our ability to capture them. This is a choice not a matter of impersonal fate. But 
how can we invoke an incapacity which we have voluntarily created to justify the 
loss of the basic right of others to defend themselves against mistaken-identity 
executions?
The necessity principle is also commonly invoked to justify harsh techniques 
of interrogation. If torturing a prisoner is the only possible way to extract action-
able intelligence about a pending terrorist attack, then torture is justified by the 
ius in bello principle of necessity. But what if torturing prisoners is the «only» 
way to extract militarily vital information because of our earlier choices about 
investing scarce resources in high-tech surveillance devices, for example, rather 
than in foreign language training? How can such a «necessity», created by our 
own actions, justify the harms inflicted on individuals who are clearly hors de 
combat? Although such a bogus justification fails both morally and logically, 
politically it succeeds well enough.
4. Keeping Open the Path to Peace
Another important source of ius in bello norms is the expectation that war 
will be followed by peace and that the belligerents will have to coexist after the 
war is over and peace is restored. This explains why the Lieber Code, written 
to govern the conduct of Northern troops during the American Civil War, was 
the first great codification of the laws of war. The inhabitants of both North and 
South expected to live side-by-side as neighbors after this terrifyingly bloody war 
was over, whatever its outcome. When belligerents, such as the Americans and 
japanese in World War II, do not expect to live together after the war, they have 
a much weaker incentive to restrict the means they adopt to defeat their enemy. 
Obviously, Western governments «at war» with international jihadists have no 
plans to live together peaceably with the enemy. Those Israelis and palestinians 
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who contemplate living together with the enemy after hostilities have ceased pre-
dictably support strong ius in bello restrictions on how the battle is conducted, 
while those who neither want nor expect peaceful coexistence in the future are 
much less likely to endorse norms that prohibit fatally stabbing random Israeli 
civilians or shooting incapacitated palestinians in the head.
The centrality of the expectation of peace to the development of ius in bello 
norms is easy to demonstrate. For example, even though lethal deception in 
wartime is ubiquitous, the kind of lethal deception that makes the transition 
from war to peace more difficult is traditionally banned. An example of legally 
permitted deceptive signaling in wartime is feigning a disorderly retreat to lure 
opposing forces into an ambush where they will be killed, wounded or captured. 
A classic and intuitively repugnant example of legally impermissible deceptive 
signaling in wartime (called «perfidy») is holding up a white flag with the aim of 
lowering the adversary’s guard. perfidy is banned because it destroys the value 
of symbols typically employed in the search to negotiate an end to war. Article 
16 of the 1863 Lieber Code says this explicitly: «military necessity [...] admits of 
deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does 
not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily 
difficult» 4. The idea that the way we fight should be restrained for the sake of 
keeping open the path to peace (reestablishing peace being an essential element 
of why we fight) was already a commonplace in eighteenth-century treatises on 
the law of war. For example: «the desire to spare the effusion of blood will by 
no means authorize us to employ perfidy, the introduction of which would be 
attended with consequences of too dreadful a nature, and would deprive sov-
ereigns, once embarked in war, of all means of treating together, or restoring 
peace» 5.
Such passages suggest the originally «Hobbesian» nature of the laws of sym-
metrical war. The primacy of the right of self-defense in the laws of war is un-
equivocally Hobbesian. And although in a formal sense there can be no crimes 
in the state of nature and therefore no «war crimes» from a strictly Hobbesian 
perspective, the conditional imperative to seek peace if others do so too provides 
a capacious foundation for many ius in bello restrictions and prohibitions 6.
Yet these restrictions, for good Hobbesian reasons, are ill-fitted to asymmet-
rical conflicts such as the war on terror. For one thing, the war on terror is unique 
because the enemy consists entirely of putative war criminals, unlike a symmetri-
cal war where enemy troops are in principle innocent of criminal mens rea and 
where there are civilian «enemy nationals» who are citizens of the enemy nation 
4 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Fran-
cis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by president Lincoln, 24 April 1863. Available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
5 de Vattel, 2008: § 174.
6 The Hobbesian basis of the classic laws of symmetrical war is found here: «it is a precept, or 
general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining 
it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first 
branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and 
follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves» 
(Hobbes, 1998: chap. xIV).
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but who are not combatants. In a symmetrical war, enemy soldiers, far from be-
having criminally, are carrying out their legal duty. There is at least some chance 
that, if you put down your weapons, they (following their commanders’ instruc-
tions) will put down theirs as well. jihadists, by contrast, are not authorized to 
use violence by an established nation state, are engaged in expressive violence 
with little coherent idea of the end-state they hope to achieve, and cannot invoke 
their duty-to-obey as a shield when attempting to surrender or requesting quar-
ter. The absence of both noncombatant enemy nationals and non-criminal enemy 
soldiers makes it almost impossible psychologically to use the conventional laws 
of armed conflict restrict the warfighting methods employed in the war on terror.
moreover, as already mentioned, terrorism is like crime in this sense: it can be 
managed but never eliminated. But a war that will never end defies the elemental 
logic supporting those laws of war that depend on a realistic hope of peace. The 
absence of any expectation of peace replacing war also removes the most basic 
incentive for the belligerents to accept any ius in bello limits on how they fight.
The one-percent doctrine reveals that why we fight inevitably shapes how 
we fight. If we are fighting for a limited military objective, we can conceivably 
restrict the methods we employ in combat. But if we are fighting for national 
survival, all such restrictions fly out the window. The same is true if those respon-
sible for conducting the war are fighting for personal survival. psychologically, 
no means appear disproportional to such ultimate ends. How many civilians 
can we «unintentionally» kill in order to kill one especially dangerous terrorist 
mastermind? What response is «proportional» to a hypothetical future threat? 
There is no answer in theory to such questions and, as we can observe, there are 
only weak limits to the conduct of counterterrorism in practice.
5. Endless War
Not only does why we fight affect how we fight, but how we fight affects why 
we fight. Ius in bello and ius ad bellum are not «logically independent» for this 
reason as well. The best current example is drone warfare. drone warfare can 
to some extent be justified on ius in bello grounds by the reasonable claim that 
drone pilots, operating far from the battlefield, are unlikely to inflict massive col-
lateral damage to civilians out of the kind of visceral panic all too common among 
ground forces operating in hostile terrain. On the other hand, drone warfare is 
problematic because it is an extreme form of low-casualty combat. Any way of 
fighting that involves minimal fatalities on one’s own side exposes the war plan-
ning process to mission creep. Why not undertake deadly strikes with only a re-
mote connection to American national security if we can do it at such little cost? 
Since antiwar activism is traditionally the product of anti-draft activism, drone 
warfare conducted by a few well-remunerated volunteers is unlikely to meet any 
sustained civilian protest, making it another potential source of endless war.
Admittedly, a government pursuing limited war aims in a way that leads to a 
high casualty rate among the soldiery will be tempted to inflate rhetorically the 
aims being pursued. This is a distortion much less likely to occur in low-casualty 
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drone warfare and constitutes an argument in its favor. On the other hand, ca-
pacities create intentions, and the availability of drones has made a seemingly 
endless involvement of the American military and CIA in foreign conflicts more 
difficult than ever to bring to a halt.
The impossibility of final victory in the war on terror is perhaps the main 
reason why the laws of war developed in the context of symmetrical conflicts are 
poorly suited to constraining the way counterterrorism is conducted. Our best 
chance for fighting terrorism within rule-of-law principles is therefore adhering 
as closely as possible to the procedural norms developed in the context of do-
mestic crime-fighting, even though these rules, too, fit only imperfectly with the 
challenges of battling the threat of international jihadism. The most important 
principle which counterterrorism must borrow from classical liberalism, in fact, 
is the individualization of culpability, originally introduced to inhibit the natural 
human tendency to mimetic violence. The individualization of culpability helps 
cauterize revenge cycles by insisting that only actual perpetrators of violently 
aggressive acts, and no other members of their kin group, are punished for com-
mitting prohibited acts.
This all-important liberal principle is absent from the laws of symmetrical 
war because symmetrical war is a conflict among groups where no evidence of 
personal guilt is required for the application of deadly force. Terrorists would 
like us to treat them as soldiers in a semi-symmetrical war. But that is an invita-
tion we need to refuse. The best hope for responding effectively to jihadism 
involves abandoning the entire idea of a war on terror (regulated by the laws of 
war) and reverting to the idea that the liberalism that we can distill from modern 
criminal law and criminal procedure provides the best framework available for 
dealing effectively with the grave and seemingly still growing terrorist threat to 
the national security of the struggling liberal democracies of both Europe and 
North America.
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